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Spanning the globe, the British Empire was a political entity unlike any the world 
has ever seen and its decolonization was truly a global phenomenon to match.  Beginning 
in 1931 and lasting through much of the twentieth century, the British Empire steadily 
began to grant self-government and full autonomy to its member states, releasing “forty-
nine territories ... in the years 1947-80” alone.1  Yet, imperial policy modifications were 
not the only transitions necessary for colonies to gain their autonomy.  Radical changes 
were occurring across the Empire socially, culturally, and intellectually—including 
changes in the way that colonial groups thought about themselves.  To elaborate, in order 
for nationalist movements to develop in the colonies, their populations had to redefine 
themselves in terms outside the British Empire; before convincing the British that they 
constituted a nation, a colony first had to believe it themselves. Furthermore, because this 
self-understanding is a necessary precursor to a nationalist movement, it is logical that a 
pattern in the process may exist.  In order to investigate, this study establishes a 
theoretical framework of changes that must occur during a nationalist movement’s bid for 
autonomy.  Through the lens of this framework, I intend to analyze the ways that colonies 
began to conceive of themselves as separate, distinct nations—specifically in the cases of 
the Dominions and India—paying particular attention to recurring processes.2  By doing 
                                                            
1 Brian Lapping, End of Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), xv.  Lapping is a former 
professional journalist turned documentarian: End of Empire is a book written in tandem with his 
documentary series by the same title. 
2 In itself, the thesis of a patterned process of decolonization has been pursued by other scholars before me; 
however, my research is unique in its focus upon the Dominions and India within the British Empire as 
well as the emphasis on their similarity in spite of their considerably differing contexts.  Examples of 
previous works that supported the existence of a pattern include Trevor Lloyd, Empire: The History of the 
British Empire (London: Hambledon and London, 2001), which suggests African colonies followed the 
example of the Muslim League in India, Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the 
Second World War (New York: Continuum, 2008), proposes that the strains of the Second World War 
affected the Dominions through similar stages in the relationship with Great Britain, and A.G. Hopkins, 
“Rethinking Decolonization,” Past & Present 200 (August 2008): 211-47, which proposes that the 
Dominions were an integral part of the overall decolonization process for the British Empire.  For an 
example of research that does not directly propose a recurring pattern across the Empire, see Robert 
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so, I intend to demonstrate that the changes that occurred in each colony’s understanding 
of their “nation” were quite similar, even though they produced widely different 
outcomes for the Dominions and India.  In fact, despite their fundamental diversity, the 
Dominions and India followed a pattern of changes in national self-perception as they 
appealed for independence from the British Empire.  This study proposes a framework of 
four prerequisite changes to the idea of the “nation” that preceded the achievement of 
independence and argues that, in spite of great diversity among colonies, the challengers 
to British rule did exhibit each characteristic in the cases presented.  Additionally, I will 
also argue that the pattern is an inherently unifying force that is closely tied to nationalist 
leaders, whose rhetoric and political activities highlight the changing perceptions of the 
nation when scrutinized appropriately.  Lastly, while these changes unified the 
populations of the Dominions, the phenomenon in India eventually resulted in the 
partition of the colony into the states of India and Pakistan.  Nonetheless, the case still 
supports the overall argument as the divergence was caused by the actions of nationalist 
leaders who fostered lingering ideas of separate communities to which connotations of 
the nation became attached, causing the split.  First, though, for these conclusions to be 
accessible, a definition of the “nation” must be established. 
The term “nation” has been used in innumerable ways throughout academia and 
the world at large.  Its meanings vary with each use, heavily dependent upon the 
predispositions of the user, ranging anywhere from straightforward, geographically-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Johnson, British Imperialism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). However, none of these studies 
place the Dominions in direct comparison with India as this study does.  Additionally, the framework I 
propose is, to my knowledge, an entirely unique application of Benedict Anderson’s and Anthony Smith’s 
theories of the “nation,” as detailed in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983) and Anthony Smith, Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century (Oxford, UK: Martin Roberston, 1979), respectively.  So, by focusing exclusively on the 
cases of the Dominions and India through this original framework derived from Anderson and Smith, this 
study adds to the intellectual debate regarding the decolonization of the British Empire. 
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defined entities shown on a map to more indefinite types like ethno-cultural (e.g. the 
Roma or “Gypsies”) or religious (e.g. the Muslim umma).  Naturally, these complexities 
require clarification.  For the purposes of this study, the term “nation” serves as a 
hybridized ethno-cultural term that draws heavily upon the theories of Benedict Anderson 
and Anthony Smith.  For Anderson, a “nation … is an imagined political community” in 
the sense that it is “both inherently limited and sovereign.” 3  In his interpretation, the 
nation is “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion.”4  This process, in Anderson’s view, is steeped in a 
sense of simultaneity, which might best be described as a person’s conscious and 
“complete confidence” in the “steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity” of people 
within the nation.5  Put another way, by associating themselves with the nation, each 
member recognizes their place alongside the perpetual, parallel existence of many others.  
Once this “imagined” form is achieved, a nation is limited in the understanding that it has 
boundaries outside of which other nations inevitably exist, sovereign because all nations 
strive for freedom, which can only truly be achieved through complete sovereignty, and 
lastly a community because “it is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” in 
spite of “actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail.”6  Anderson’s vision of a 
“nation,” then, depends as much upon self-image as any tangible group. 
Echoing Anderson in many ways, Anthony Smith’s definitions of a “nation” also 
revolve around intellectual understandings rather than concrete clusters of people or 
                                                            
3Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 26.  For a broader discussion of Anderson’s simultaneity concept, see Ibid., 22-36. 
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7. 
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physically defined states.  In Smith’s formulation, any “nation is distinct and unique … 
has its peculiar contribution to make to the whole, the family of nations … and defines 
the identity of its members, because its specific culture moulds the individual.”7  
Moreover, each nation’s culture is defined by its history, which “binds present and future 
generations, like links in a chain, to all those who preceded them.”8  Smith’s words 
indicate a similar understanding of the nation as a bounded entity that recognizes the 
presence of other nations.  Each nation possesses a common historical culture that 
provides a sense of community as well as definition.  In addition, for Smith, a nation also 
“entails a certain kind of solidarity and political programme,” nationalism, that “is based 
on the possession of the land: … the historic land; the land of past generations,” an 
attachment grounded in the historical culture.9  However, Smith distinguishes his theory 
by asserting that nationalists (promoters of the “political programme” of the nation) 
inherently “adapt the vision, the culture, the solidarity and the programme to diverse 
situations and interests” as a means of dissemination.10  Put another way, a nation is 
commonly expanded through “top down” processes, by nationalist leader who publicize 
and thereby circulate their program of identity and politics.  While Anderson discusses 
the “top down” utility of the nation and nationalism at length, he ultimately concludes 
this application of nationalist rhetoric as a means of active expansion only developed as a 
later process in the historical lifespan of the concept of nations, rather than being an 
inherent component of idea from the beginning.11  All the same, the definitions overlap in 
                                                            
7Smith, Nationalism, 2.  For a later example of Smith’s ideas on nations that incorporates Anderson’s work, 
see Anthony Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002). 
8 Ibid., 3. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 In his book, Anderson discusses “official nationalisms” as a subsection of “nationalism” itself.  Official 
nationalisms were developed in reaction to the emergence of organic nations and nationalism throughout 
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a number of overt ways.  To summarize, then, my definition stems from within each of 
these academic trends.  As far as this study is concerned, a nation is an insubstantial idea, 
within which someone associates themselves along historically based cultural ties and is 
connected to a geographical location that can be defined explicitly or ambiguously, but 
does not necessarily incorporate all inhabitants within that location nor does the group 
necessarily reside in that territory.  Additionally, this nation is bounded by these 
attachments.  In short, a “nation” is very much an intellectual concept that is continually 
subject to redefinition over time, and it is this process of redefinition from the “top down” 
that pertains to this study. 
In order to observe and compare the redefinition of each colony’s self-
perceptions, a framework of four prerequisite changes has been formulated from the 
characterization of the “nation.”  Each prerequisite represents a fundamental part of the 
definition of a “nation;” therefore, the list of four prerequisites will serve as a checklist 
for each victorious nationalist movement and, eventually, for comparison within this 
framework.  For instance, the most basic of these prerequisite changes to the conception 
of the nation is whether or not a colonial population views themselves as a distinctly 
unified group.  Many times, sticking closely to Anderson’s theories, the transition toward 
ideas of unity is fostered through processes of simultaneity—e.g. repeated references to 
the entity in newspapers or to a perceived common heroic past.  In this case, each colony 
had to become aware of or build an identifiable historical past that was distinguishable in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Europe in the 1820s.  From this point on, Anderson attests that the ideas implied in a nation could be and 
frequently were adapted by leaders to address specific issues or incorporate new people.  However, this 
phenomenon was not an inherent aspect of a nation in his definition.  For further information on official 
nationalisms, see Anderson, Imagined Communities, 83-112; for details about the natural development of 
“imagined communities” (i.e. nations) prior to the appearance of official nationalisms, see Ibid., 37-46, 61-
5, 67-82. 
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some manner from the history associated with the British Empire’s nation.  Additionally, 
of the four, this prerequisite is arguably the most foundational, but it is difficult to say 
that it generally appears first as each of these criteria are fundamentally intertwined to the 
others.  Referring back to Anderson and Smith, this prerequisite is synonymous with the 
idea of the nation being “imagined,” as groups must be able to recognize their 
membership within a unified group, whose members they could never hope to meet.  So, 
for purposes of analysis, this prerequisite will be considered fulfilled when the rhetoric of 
prominent, popular political figures (e.g. leaders of majority parties that eventually 
assumed control of the government) or newspapers refer to the people of the group in 
terms of the nation or refer to that imagined community’s past or traditions.  Put 
differently, the “imagined” prerequisite is fulfilled when popular leaders can utilize 
rhetoric of the nation they are promoting because the members of that nation are expected 
to infer that the message is for them, i.e. their inclusion in this unified entity is ubiquitous 
at that point. 
Based in the common history and unity of the “imagined” prerequisite, the second 
prerequisite can most appropriately be linked to ideas of the limitations upon the nation.  
To elaborate, because a nation exists in a world among other nations and is therefore 
limited, any group striving to assume nationhood must be able to recognize the 
differences between their nation and external ones and thereby determine who belongs to 
the group.  In this case, for a nationalist group or colony to gain their independence, it 
was necessary to recognize that their perceived nation lay outside the British Empire, in 
direct opposition to the idea that the colony was positioned within the national entity of 
the Empire itself.  In many colonies, national groups often originally felt their best 
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interests were well represented by the British Empire’s greater interests, particularly in 
the cases of the Dominions.  As time wore on, though, colonial nationalists came to 
recognize an erosion of common vested interests.  In turn, these perceived disconnections 
between the perceived best interests of the colony and British goals and activities fuelled 
a sense of disillusionment with British leadership.  As feelings of disenchantment with 
the Empire became more pervasive, groups increasingly recognized the disunity of 
interests between their nation and the British Empire.  Clearly, this realization facilitated 
a shift in the idea of how their nation was related to the Empire.  Whereas the colony 
once held common interests with the British Empire, the nationalists’ growing frustration 
with British leadership revealed that the British were actually outside their nation, thus 
reinforcing the sense of limitations by promoting an “us” (the nation) and “them” 
(outside groups represented here by the British) mentality.  With this in mind, rhetoric 
that promotes this “us and them” mentality or reveals a sense of disillusionment with 
British leadership can be said to fulfill the “limited” prerequisite by cultivating ideas of 
separation between the British Empire and the growing nation.   
Alongside the growing perception of divisions between the British and emerging 
national identity, the “community” prerequisite often emerged as a close parallel to the 
“limited” one.  As the other processes mature, the embryonic nation begins to recognize 
that its internally unified interests are misrepresented by the external British.  Therefore, 
the group must soon develop a means of presenting their common interests as a group.  
Concisely, the imagined and limited ideas foster desires for self-sufficiency and accurate 
representation that buttress the idea of “community.”  Of course, the “community” 
prerequisite is closely linked to the perceived differences and limitations between the 
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nation and the British, but it is also different in that the “community” prerequisite extends 
one step further, to active pursuit of community goals.  While the limited prerequisite can 
be demonstrated by the recognition of divergent interests and rhetoric of disenchantment, 
the “community” prerequisite is embodied by active attempts to pursue the interests that 
have been recognized as unique or distinct.  These efforts can be manifested in a variety 
of ways, whether cultural (festivals attesting to national heritage or tradition), economic 
(strikes, protests), diplomatic (foreign relations only), or any other means of asserting the 
group’s reliance on itself.  By actively taking up activities designed to address the 
specific interests of the group members, the nation assumes responsibility for its concerns 
and seeks to openly display their acceptance of this charge.  Therefore, public exhibitions 
become symbolic of an emerging nation’s self-sufficiency and independent interests—
thus attesting to the existence of separate nation.  Certainly, by undertaking exhibitions 
publicly, the nation implies that it constitutes a self-reliant “community,” attempts to 
establish its capabilities and distinctiveness in the eyes of external nations, and satisfies 
the third prerequisite. 
Finally, the “sovereignty” prerequisite is also a critical component of the 
necessary changes to the self-perception of the nation.  Naturally catalyzed by the other 
three prerequisites, the “sovereignty” prerequisite is relatively clear-cut:  a group must 
seek to assert its sovereignty—an indication of desires for freedom—to fully constitute a 
nation.  Simply put, a group must pursue domestic and international political change, in 
the form of constitutional reform, for the prerequisite to be completed.  However, the 
group must go beyond mere requests for such reforms in order to distinguish these efforts 
from the evidence of the “community” prerequisite; their demands must, eventually, be 
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successful in attaining constitutional reforms, thereby gaining measures of literal 
sovereignty.  Most often, the constitutional reforms represent steps toward full autonomy 
for the nation and concessions from the imperial sovereign, in this case the British.  
Demands for constitutional measures of self-government, full autonomy, reduction of 
British control, or withdrawal of British bureaucracy and forces are frequent indications 
of progress toward completion of this prerequisite.  Of course, the “sovereignty” 
prerequisite is only genuinely satisfied in the moment of ultimate constitutional 
autonomy, but, by examining the rhetoric of leaders and other evidence, the progress 
toward that goal can be uncovered as well, just as the combined framework reveals the 
overall progress. 
In applying this framework, though, this study operates on several overarching 
assumptions.  First, it is assumed that a nation must fulfill all of the prerequisites before 
becoming an autonomous state.  Second, it is ventured that the evidence of a 
prerequisite’s fulfillment is manifested in an observable, public manner through the 
rhetoric of nationalist leaders, which contributes to the developing culture of 
simultaneity.  Third, this study also operates under the impression that nationalist leaders 
are representative of their supporters’ views of the nation.  In this regard, Smith’s 
definition suggests that the leaders promote their ideas through their positions as leaders.  
In turn, acceptance of this “top down” dissemination mechanism implies that a given 
leader would cease to be relevant in a nationalist movement if their message were not 
being accepted by the intended audience of the nation.  Thus, a leader’s continued 
prominence implies a cycle of successful intellectual diffusion, thereby garnering 
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supporters whose ideas the leader now represents.12  Finally, in light of the three previous 
assumptions, it is henceforth presumed that, by selecting the most prominent leaders, the 
dominant views of the nation can be accessed.  Therefore, by combining the four 
prerequisites under these assumptions, a single cohesive framework is created through 
which the wealth of intensive studies of individual movements can be applied to expose 
broader, empire-wide trends or to facilitate comparisons. 
Despite the potential for this framework to be applied across the entirety of the 
British Empire, this study is restricted to comparisons of the Dominions, India, and 
Pakistan for several reasons.  Now, granted that the British Empire’s decolonization was 
very much an individualized process, the framework above attempts to circumvent many 
such issues by standardizing the method of analysis the ways that very different colonies 
identified themselves as a nation.  However the Dominions and Indian colony were 
undeniably treated differently by the British, a situation that is emphasized by the manner 
in which L.J. Butler divides the colonies into three categories based on the ways that they 
were governed within British Empire: 
The most senior members of the empire, the “Dominions” or “[white] settlement 
colonies” constituted a distinct group.  Between the [world] wars, their sometimes 
ambiguous relationship with London would be clarified and given statutory form.  
India, long considered the most valuable “possession”, was so important in the 
imperial schema that it technically constituted an empire in its own right.  The 
remainder of the dependent empire defied the taxonomer’s art, being composed of 
around 60 colonies, protectorates, and other constitutional abstractions.13 
 
Clearly, the distribution of colonies across Butler’s three categories is heavily 
disproportionate, grouping the vast majority of colonies within the final ambiguous 
                                                            
12 Of course, this cyclical formulation is not the only means by which a nationalist leader can garner new 
supporters, but it is the only mechanism with which this study is concerned. 
13 L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 1.  
Butler is a history lecturer at the University of Bedfordshire, formerly Luton University, in England. 
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group.  His distinctions pay homage to the fundamentally different approaches that 
Britain and her officials took toward each group.  The Dominions were informally 
allowed measures of autonomy for many years, India was carefully managed to maximize 
Britain’s benefit, and the other colonies were, in one way or another, controlled through 
measures of “indirect rule.”  In addition, the method by which any imperial sovereign 
governs its colonial subjects can be assumed to have a critical formative influence on 
nationalist movements.  So, because the methods of governing are fundamentally 
important, the British forms of colonial governance represent a necessary consideration in 
any attempt to explain differences between each colony’s ideas of their nation.  Hence, 
Butler’s classification will be applied within this article to emphasize these essential 
dissimilarities.  In particular, each of the Dominions—South Africa, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand—will first be considered, as they achieved their independence at the 
earliest dates.  Following those examinations, the analysis will shift its focus toward the 
Indian sub-continent and the movements that eventually created the modern countries of 
India and Pakistan.  In this way, I attempt to effectively provide an in depth comparison 
without compromising a worldly perspective. 
In order to execute this fusion, though, a second compromise must be made.  In 
almost every circumstance, the changing ideas of the nation birthed numerous nationalist 
movements with a wide array for platforms.  Of course, each of these movements 
provides an opportunity for researchers to gain valuable information about the colonial 
resistance movements that developed in opposition to the British.  In fact, the prevalence 
of multiple groups competing to institute their conception of the nation is one of the main 
reasons that studies focusing on individual colonies are so valuable historically—close 
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examinations can examine how and why one group or a few groups achieve(s) 
recognition over others.  However, to incorporate each of the examples effectively, many 
of these groups must be excluded.  Specifically, in each example colony, I will focus on 
the activities of the major nationalist group(s), and especially the words of their leaders, 
to isolate the ways in which groups that took the reins from the British envisioned the 
nation.  Because these movements successfully achieved independence, their 
understanding of the nation must be relied upon as an important example of the changing 
ideas of nation.  Furthermore, this study seeks to compare successful movements as a 
means of determining whether a common pattern toward independence can be found; 
thus, peripheral groups, while useful for elaboration in more specific studies, are 
extraneous to this examination and can be omitted.  So, by relying on the rhetoric of 
victorious nationalist movements, the specific examples allow us to circumvent (or at 
least minimize) the prominent issues raised by employing the framework above, a benefit 
which is well illustrated in the cases of the Dominions. 
The Dominions 
At the highest level of colonial status, the Dominions held a status that inspired 
jealousy in other colonies.  Of Great Britain’s colonies, the Dominions were allowed the 
most autonomy because they were “colonies of white settlement … regarded as part of a 
‘greater Britain’” settled by “agents of British civilization.”14  In other words, as 
“colonies of white settlement,” South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were 
allowed large measures of internal autonomy, such as independently elected parliaments 
which could pass laws and operated strictly internal affairs of the colony, because they 
                                                            
14 Johnson, British Imperialism, 59.  Johnson served in the British Royal Army, attaining the rank of 
Captain, before earning a PhD and becoming a professor of history at Warwick University in London, 
England, where he continues research on British imperialism to this day. 
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were composed of emigrant Britons.15  However, it should be understood such measures 
were not granted to the Dominions from the outset of their establishment.  Actually, as 
was often the case with the colonies, each Dominion started as a conglomerate of 
unaffiliated ports, towns, and trading posts that gradually developed into individually 
managed colonies, like New South Wales in Australia and Ontario in Canada.  Finally, in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, constituent states began to merge into singular 
entities and eventually recognized a common, centralized government.16  One historian, 
Barbara Bush, puts forth that this “trusteeship” was based on and implied “the ‘divine 
right’ of superior ‘Anglo-Saxons’ to rule the less civilized peoples” found in the 
Dominions.17 Undeniably, “such attitudes” on behalf of the British “endorsed white 
settler rule and confirmed the imperial ‘colour bar’ dividing dependent non-white tropical 
colonies,” such as India or the Gold Coast, “from self-governing ‘white Dominions’.”18  
Indeed, this consideration was a decisive determining factor in the establishment of the 
overall imperial hierarchy of colonial status, most notably by warranting special 
treatment for the Dominons. 
Clearly, then, scholarly opinion maintains that “…Britain … paid more attention 
to cooperation with the people … who populated” the white settler Dominions, which 
                                                            
15 The colonies of Ireland and Newfoundland also carried Dominion statuses at various times.  Ireland has 
been excluded from this investigation as scholars generally do not include it in discussions with the other 
Dominions because it generally behaved in such drastically unique manners as to be considered entirely 
distinct.  For example, when other Dominions dutifully (albeit with often vocalized concerns) participated, 
Ireland elected to remain neutral during World War II.  Newfoundland has also been omitted because, after 
attaining Dominion status in 1907, the Dominion forfeited its self-government and accepted direct British 
colonial rule again in order to weather the hardships of the Depression, before being annexed into the 
Canadian Dominion during World War II.  Further discussion of the nature of Dominion status can be 
found in Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: Hambledon Continuum, 
2006), xi; L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire, 1-6; Stewart, Empire Lost, viii-xi, 4, 5, 9-13. 
16 Each individual unification process  will be elaborate upon in more detail later. 
17 Barbara Bush, Imperialism, Race, and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919-1945 (London: Routledge, 
1999), 34.  Bush is a professor of English and History at Sheffield Hallam University in Sheffield, UK. 
18 Ibid. 
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maintained a sense of good will between these colonies and the British government 
during this period.19  At the same time, though, while Britain allowed the white settler 
communities to unify and to have measures of centralized, domestic self-government, it is 
critical to remember that “self-government did not mean separation” and the British 
government actively continued policies of settlement throughout this time as well.20  
Consequently, the continuous stream of incoming British immigrants nurtured a close 
sense of kinship between Britons in both locations by steadily adding migrants born in 
Britain, who thus perpetuated long established links to the British Empire.  In other 
words, the influx of immigrant Britons to the Dominions sustained a constant, visible 
connection to British identities, even as they centralized throughout the mid- to late-
1800s.  With the combination of Britain’s agreeable disposition and the incoming waves 
of new settlers, it is unsurprising that these colonies held the closest ties to Great Britain. 
Despite their bonds, however, the Dominions were the first of Britain’s imperial 
possessions to be given their independence.  Originally evolving without a clear 
definition, the Dominion status was first articulated formally in public by the 1926 
Balfour Declaration.  Calling the Dominions “‘equal in status, in no way subordinate one 
to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs … freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations’,” the Balfour Declaration was an 
improvement in the eyes of the Dominions, but held no technical legal power.  And so, 
by 1931, under continuing pressure, the British again accommodated the Dominions, as 
the Statute of Westminster constitutionalized the status itself, ostensibly making the 
                                                            
19Lloyd, Empire, 103.  Lloyd is a retired history professor, previously tenured at the University of Toronto; 
Empire was his last publication before retirement, though he remains an active participant in academia in 
his retirement. 
20 Johnson, British Imperialism, 62.  For further details, see Johnson, British Imperialism, 59-74 
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Dominions their own sovereign entities.21  But how were the Dominions—the colonies 
most connected to Britain itself—able to achieve such independence when acts of protest 
were rarely met with such accommodation in other colonies?  In these cases, critical 
answers (or components of answers) lie in the relationships developing between the 
Dominions and the British Empire during the First World War, the interwar period, and 
the Second World War.  Over the tumultuous years of 1910-1945, each colony developed 
its own ideas of nation, at the expense of the British national identity that had been so 
carefully cultivated throughout the nineteenth century.  In each example, the colonies 
developed a sense of unity and national sentiment that can be observed through the 
framework and suggests that a pattern may exist that occurs no matter the context.  This 
trend toward independent self-images of the nation is perhaps most clearly demonstrated 
in, South Africa. 
South Africa 
 Largely populated by Dutch, Flemish, French, and German descended people—
known either as “Boers,” derived from the Dutch word for farmer, or as “Afrikaners,” 
referring to the Afrikaans language they spoke — throughout much of the nineteenth 
century, British influence in South Africa only began to increase during the 1820s when a 
marked jump in Britons began relocating to the colony.  While the region’s native 
African inhabitants vastly outnumbered the European peoples, the Boer, or Afrikaner, 
population in the area had established policies of slavery and exploitation from the early 
stages of colonization.  With the appearance of the liberalizing British influence (slavery 
had been abolished in the Empire in 1833), the white settler populations frequently 
                                                            
21 Balfour Declaration, 1926, George 5, http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth11_doc 
_1926.pdf (accessed April 23, 2010). 
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clashed along topics of race relations as well as other topics.  From the beginning, “the 
Boers … viewed the British with suspicion” and were particularly “uneasy about British 
expansion” in the region.22  In fact, harboring fears of British oppression and traditions of 
racial exploitation of Africans, many Boers relocated toward the interior of Southern 
Africa in the middle of the century, creating the sovereign political states of the Transvaal 
Republic (1852) and the Orange Free State (1854).  As a result, the British were left as de 
facto European controllers of the original coastal Cape Colony and, as such, initially 
respected the Boers’ autonomy.  Nonetheless, by the 1870s, the British had resolved to 
form a South African confederation, to include the Boer Republics, on the model of the 
Canadian colonies.  Thus, in 1877, British forces invaded the Transvaal Republic, an 
endeavor that ended in humiliating defeat for the British when the Boers rebelled in 1881, 
forcing the British out of the country and re-establishing their independence.  However, 
with the discovery of vast deposits of mineral wealth in these Boer republics, especially 
gold in the Transvaal in 1886, British expansionist interests were piqued again.  Thus, in 
1899, the British again invaded the Boer Republics, touching off the Boer War which 
ended in British victory in 1902.  Following the war, British migration to these colonies 
spiked, with nearly 220,000 Britons relocating from 1901-10, up from just 76,000 in 
1881-90.23In the words of historian Robert Johnson, the Empire’s “plan was to 
accommodate the Boers, reconstruct the country economically and forge the unity 
between Boers and British they had envisaged as early as 1877.”24  This process 
ultimately culminated in 1910 when the Transvaal Republic and Orange Free State (both 
now under British administration) joined with the Cape Colony and Natal to officially 
                                                            
22 Johnson, British Imperialism, 71. 
23 Johnson, British Imperialism, 63. 
24 Ibid., 73. 
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form the Union of South Africa.  After its unification, South Africa was placed alongside 
the other white settler communities within the British Empire under the “Dominion” 
status.  Despite appearances and South Africa’s technical unity, it is critically important 
to recognize that deep-seated cleavages (Boer-British, European-African, etc.) had been 
established within South African society, providing the cultural raw material on which a 
distinctly South African historical tradition and experience could be constructed in the 
nation’s imagination. 
 Indeed, a closer examination reveals that these schisms produced a background 
that unmistakably aided the transition toward independence by distinguishing the South 
African nation from that of the British Empire.  In particular, as World War I opened, 
South African public opinion was highly divided in 1914 between imperial patriotism and 
outright opposition to the war, unsurprisingly along the British and Afrikaner division.25  
For example, Prime Minister Louis Botha and Defense Minister Jan Smuts believed “that 
South Africa, as part of the Empire, was automatically at war.”26  These former Boer War 
generals turned British loyalists had anticipated full cooperation given their association to 
the Afrikaners.27  However, “nationalist-minded Afrikaners were outraged at being asked 
                                                            
25 Interestingly, race relations were another source of division within South Africa.  In actuality, race 
relations were calmed in South Africa during these eras, especially in World War I.  Scholars claim that 
both groups enlisted with aspirations to win concessions from their oppressors (whites from the British and 
Africans from whites). It is also worth noting that whites did not allow Africans to be equipped or recruited 
as combat troops; therefore, few South African non-whites served in combat forces.  For further 
information, see Jackson, British Empire, 242-3; David Killingray, “Labour Exploitation for Military 
Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870-1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 24 (July 1989): 491, 
496. 
26 Alan Paton, South African Tragedy: The Life and Times of Jan Hofmeyr (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1965), 38.  Paton was a native South African author and anti-apartheid activist before his passing in 
1988. 
27 In using the term “loyalist” to describe Botha and Smuts, I mean that they favored continued association 
to the British Empire.  It should be noted that these sentiments, particularly in Smuts’s case as several 
quotes above will demonstrate, were likely fueled by beliefs that South Africa’s personal interests were 
best served, for the time being, within the Empire.  This conclusion is based on the fact that, following 
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to take arms on the side of the British empire [sic], which as they saw it had so recently 
unjustly destroyed the independence of their republics” in the Boer War.28  As a result, “a 
group of leading Boer generals declared themselves in favour of independence … and 
launched a rebellion” shortly thereafter that Botha and Smuts quickly crushed in October, 
with straggling fugitives surrendering as late as February 1915.29  According to Hew 
Strachan, the rebellion and speed of suppression were aimed at “forcing Boers to decide 
where they stood.”30  Additionally, Johnson said punishments for rebels “were lenient” 
with “short” prison terms and no treason executions.31  In many ways, the staunchest 
opposition existed in the Parliament.  Displeased with the South Africa Party’s support 
for the war, a number of politicians separated to create the Nationalist Party “in 1914, on 
a platform of Afrikaner nationalism, South African self-sufficiency and opposition to 
participation in the ‘European war’….”32  This party “raised a challenge to the imperial 
connection and helped to foster that siege mentality which did so much to distort South 
African politics in the decades that followed.”33   
Underscoring these disruptive developments, leading political figures of both the 
Afrikaner and British groups bickered back and forth with each other throughout the war, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
World War I, many leaders’ opinions switched drastically to exploit South Africa’s contributions toward 
the war effort as leverage toward autonomy. 
28 John Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa (London: James Currey, 1987), 165.  Omer-Cooper was 
the head of the history department at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand.  He was educated 
in his native South Africa and originally taught at the University of Nigeria in Lusaka before moving onto 
Otago.  He died in 1998. 
29 Johnson, British Imperialism, 140. 
30 Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 71.  Strachan is a 
Scottish military historian who has held positions at Oxford University and the University of Glasgow. 
31 Johnson, British Imperialism, 140; Johnson’s interpretation of the backlash against rebellious Afrikaners 
is supported elsewhere as well.  For further details see J.C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts (London: Cassel 
and Company, 1952), 143-46.  In this case, the author J.C. Smuts refers to the eldest son of the former Boer 
general.  The younger Smuts applied numerous primary materials gathered from his father’s archives and 
his own recollections to the biography he produced after his father’s death. 
32 Johnson, British Imperialism, 140. 
33 Ibid., 140-1. 
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particularly so in the first two years of the war.  Though he did not participate in the 
rebellion, General J.M.B. Hertzog—the main political representative of Afrikaner 
opinion, a future Prime Minister of South Africa, and a veteran of the Boer War—openly 
railed against imperialism.  For instance, campaigning against further participation in the 
war in the summer of 1915, Hertzog often repeated that “South Africa has done enough 
for the Empire.”34  From the British loyalist perspective, future Prime Minister, Jan 
Smuts, retorted in August of 1915, “We want one South Africa, one united people,” later 
claiming he would “work with my last breath for the good of South Africa,” in 
cooperation with the British Empire.35  Obviously, the two Boer generals held 
dramatically differing opinions about South Africa’s role in the war. 
However, while the various reactions of groups and leaders ostensibly indicate a 
tumultuous society, the strength of the societal polarization actually showed that several 
prerequisite changes to the ideas of nation were already occurring at this point.  For 
example, the past strife between Boers and British colonists provided a common (if 
turbulent) historical past, an anti-British mentality (for the Boers, at least), and a cause 
for loyalists to reach out to the Boers—the former two facilitating re-imaginations of the 
nation and the latter emphasizing its boundaries.  Similarly, the revolt and the formation 
of the Nationalist Party evidenced of Boers’ belief that the British Empire did not 
adequately—or never had—represent their interests.  So, the Boers acknowledged the 
divisions between their group’s aims and Britain’s, inspiring the officers and politicians 
to act in opposition in their respective manners.  This tacit acknowledgment and active 
                                                            
34 J.M.B. Hertzog, quoted in Smuts, Smuts, 158.  The strength Hertzog’s opposition to the British is further 
emphasized by the fact that he was arguing that South Africa had already contributed enough at a time 
before any Dominion troops, let alone South African ones, had been committed.  South Africa’s 
contributions to this point had consisted entirely of financial assistance. 
35 Jan Smuts, quoted in Ibid., 159. 
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pursuit of goals clearly complied with the expectations of the “limited” and “community” 
prerequisites.  Furthermore, the leniency extended toward the rebels after their revolt was 
suppressed is indicative that the loyalists may have recognized the rebels as fellow 
members of South Africa and, regardless, certainly did not desire to punish them to the 
fullest extent of the law.  This leniency thus was an overt shift away from long 
established Afrikaner-British friction and contempt that hints at a change in the way the 
groups “imagined” themselves, suggestive that the loyalists now included their former 
antagonists within their identity or, at the very least, no longer viewed them as stark 
enemies.  Either way, the mercy exhibited by the loyalists insinuates that the groups’ 
ideas of inclusion and unity were changing, evocative of the “imagined” prerequisite.  
Similarly, while Hertzog’s and Smuts’s statements offer opposite opinions of the war, the 
rhetoric of both men referred to what South Africa should do as a single entity.  These 
prominent politicians were not appealing to Boers or Loyalists only, but to all of South 
Africa.  Hertzog and Smuts both identified with the Boer past and had conceived of 
distinct South Africans, clearly supporting ideas of unity outlined in the “imagined” 
prerequisite.  What’s more, because both men repeatedly employed such rhetoric 
throughout their careers, it is quite likely that the men not only represented a consensus of 
their supporters (who would not have been supporters if they disagreed) but also 
disseminated such ideas.  In turn, these observations suggest that, though not allied with 
each other per se, each group was acting and leaders were speaking on behalf of what 
they believed to be the common best interests for South Africa, rather than Afrikaners or 
British, as the “community” prerequisite would anticipate.  As a result, it appears that, 
less than a decade after their official political union, Afrikaners and British had begun to 
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imagine themselves within a South African community larger than their respective 
groups. 
On the other hand, the two groups had yet to recognize their common interest in 
World War I, which explains the total lack of appeals for constitutional reform.  Perhaps 
in deference to the war’s priority, no unified attempts toward the “sovereignty” 
prerequisite’s characteristic constitutional reforms were made during the World War I 
period in South Africa.  Only the formation of the Nationalist Party, whose platform 
specifically called for self-sufficiency and independence, hinted at future political efforts 
toward reform.  Once the war had ended, though, the temperate demeanor of South 
African politicians changed dramatically.  After their wartime contributions, grudging 
though they were, both groups in South Africa believed they were justified to make 
demands.36  In particular, Hertzog was elected prime minister in 1924 on a platform 
based heavily in the opinion that “it was vital that the Union’s membership … should be 
the result of choice, not constraint.”37  Therefore, in 1926, trying to appease post war 
“pressure from within the Commonwealth, particularly from South Africa …, Britain 
sought to clarify the meaning of Dominion status” with the Balfour Declaration.38  The 
document offered the following definition of Dominion status: 
They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in 
no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external 
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated 
as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.39 
                                                            
36 South African troops pursued a successful offensive campaign against German South-West Africa 
commanded by Louis Botha.  For a detailed account of the campaign, see Strachan, World War in Africa, 
62-4, 72-92. 
37 Andrew Roberts and A.P. Walshe, “Southern Africa,” in From 1905-1940, ed. A.D. Roberts, vol. 7 of 
The Cambridge History of Africa, ed. J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University, 1986), 584. 
38 Butler, Britain and Empire, 5. 
39 Balfour Declaration, 1926, George 5, http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth11_doc 
_1926.pdf (accessed April 23, 2010). 
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As Butler proposes, this concession was, for Britain, intended as “a means of 
strengthening [imperial bonds] by emphasizing the equality of Britain and the 
Dominions.”40 Yet, while the other Dominions approved of the Balfour Declaration’s 
acknowledgment of their autonomy, South African politicians desired more.  Hertzog 
“wanted to go much further,” seeking “the right to amend their own constitutions 
without” British involvement.41  Writing to the British Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Leo Amery, Smuts articulated his belief that “the definition of Dominion status 
in some formal manner had become overdue” and his resolve “for full Dominion 
nationhood and independent status.”42  Still, ever the loyalist, Smuts tempered his 
opinion, saying “… but I equally recognize the value of the Empire as a whole and the 
necessity of keeping it intact.”43  Hertzog and Smuts, who recognized the potential 
benefits for South Africa, came together and badgered the British government 
unceasingly until the Statute of Westminster, “[a]n Act to give effect to certain 
resolutions passed by Imperial Conferences held in the years 1926 and 1930,” 
constitutionalized the Balfour Definition as well as guaranteed complete legislative and 
executive autonomy.44  Clearly, these activities constitute efforts to obtain sovereignty 
over the historically envisioned national territory (as well as the final unifying power of 
the process, allying Hertzog and Smuts); hence, the “sovereignty” prerequisite was 
clearly fulfilled by South Africa.  Overall, because the divisions within South African 
society were so well-developed, it appears that conceptions of the nation were quickly 
                                                            
40 Ibid. 
41 Lloyd, Empire, 152. 
42 Jan C. Smuts to Leo Amery, Cape Town, February 22, 1927, in vol. 5 of Selections from the Smuts 
Papers, ed. Jean van der Poel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 222. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Statute of Westminster, 1931, George 5, http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId= 
1081723 #586853 (accessed April 23, 2010). 
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transformed from associations with Afrikaner or British self-images toward singular, 
unified identity by the common experiences under centralized government during the 
World War I era. 
Canada 
 Comparatively, ideas of a unified Canadian nation matured less rapidly than those 
of South Africa.  At the same time, the prerequisites do reveal changes quite similar to 
those in South Africa and, by the 1931 signing of the Statute of Westminster, Canada was 
voicing her desire for constitutional independence alongside her sister Dominion.  Much 
like South Africa, the Dominion of Canada consisted largely of two main groups of 
people, French and British.  While these two groups were far less antagonistic toward 
each other than the Afrikaners and Boers originally were, the divisions created a 
comparable scenario of divergent identities that came to conceive of themselves together 
in Canada.  Also reminiscent of the South African case, Canada’s development in the 
nineteenth century was defined by “gradual consolidation.  Four provinces had united 
under the British North America Act in 1867” and were joined in 1870 and 1871 by the 
provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia, respectively.45  As British emigration 
continued, “institutions had emerged to cater for the separate English and French-
speaking populations,” distinctly concentrated in their own provinces, most notably with 
French speakers in Quebec.  All the same, the unification process in Canada was 
completed rather smoothly and the incorporation of two groups helped distinguish a new 
Canadian history that, while not as volatile in South Africa, would be an important factor 
in changing ideas in the future.  As the First World War loomed on the horizon, “Canada 
                                                            
45 Johnson, British Imperialism, 69-70. 
  23
 
 
remained a federal state despite unification,” with Canadians cognizant that London still 
harbored “expectations of acquiescence in [their] centralised authority.”46 
 Yet, the World War I period in Canada caused dramatic changes in the ways that 
settlers in the Dominion considered their place in the British Empire.  Unlike the reaction 
in South Africa, Canada’s reaction was one of unified loyalty to Britain and the Empire at 
the outset of World War I.  Throughout the Dominion, a sense of voluntarism driven by 
Canadian desires to “do their bit” and prove their value to the Empire rapidly created a 
“patriotic consensus in English-speaking Canada.”47  This voluntarism was seen in both 
recruiting numbers, as “young Canadians were eager to enlist,” and financial donations 
throughout the war, with the Canadian Patriotic Fund accruing some $47 million in 1919, 
the last year of the war.48  According to military historians Desmond Morton and J.L. 
Granatstein, “Canadians, that August [1914], were united” as even Parliament called “a 
party truce for as long as Canada was in danger” and “[d]issidents … agreed to hold their 
tongues.”49  This truce is important because the suggestion that “Canada was in danger” 
discloses the proximity with which Canadians associated themselves with the British 
nation, so closely that danger to England was synonymous with direct danger to Canada.  
One Canadian parliamentarian was paraphrased as declaring “that Canada was of one 
mind and one heart: supportive of Britain.”50  Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime 
                                                            
46 Ibid., 71. 
47 Johnson, British Imperialaism, 27. 
48 For further details about enthusiasm for enlisting and recruitment statistics, see Desmond Morton and 
J.L. Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919 (Toronto: Lester & 
Orpen Dennys, 1989), 30-1; for greater explanation of civilian contributions, both financial and other, see 
Ibid., 23-5.  It is also noteworthy that Canada never instituted a conscription program at any point during 
the war, which also attests to steady voluntarism. 
49 Morton and Granatstein, Armageddon, 6.  Morton is a veteran of the Canadian army and the Hiram Mills 
professor of History at McGill University. Granatstein also served in the Canadian military and later 
became a professor of history at York University, before retiring in 1996. 
50 Johnson, British Imperialism, 138. 
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minister, illustrated this sense of unified duty to Britain repeatedly too, often situating the 
Dominion within the British Empire’s community quite clearly. In a speech delivered in 
December 1914, Borden stated that “our citizens may be called out to defend our own 
territory, but cannot be required to go beyond the seas except for the defence of Canada 
itself … voluntarily the manhood of Canada stands ready to fight beyond the seas in this 
just quarrel for the Empire and its liberties.”51  Two weeks later, he proclaimed, “It is 
hardly necessary to emphasize the unity of purpose which actuates the entire Empire in 
this struggle.”52  All of these factors certainly demonstrate a sense of unity, but the unity 
was behind a British conception of the nation.  However, as demonstrated in South 
Africa, with this pre-existing unity in place, radical changes in perceptions of the nation 
could occur at any time. 
   As the war persisted and casualties mounted, Canadians discovered that Britain 
was not the perfect leader they had envisioned and, as reports of Canadian soldiers’ 
heroism trickled in, many began to acknowledge differences between British officers’ 
faults and their troops’ valor.  As a result, many people began to recognize the war as 
“Canadians’ baptism of fire, and they made a name for themselves,” internationally as 
well as domestically.53  By creating this impression, the conflict acted as a catalyst for the 
transition from identification within the British Empire to viewing Canada as its own 
group.  In particular, people in Canada—especially the political leaders—soon 
                                                            
51 Sir Robert Borden, “Speech before the Canadian Club of Halifax,” December 18, 1914, in the Library 
and Archives of Canada, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/primeministers/h4-4043-e.html (accessed 
April 23, 2010). 
52 Sir Robert Borden, “Speech before the Canadian Club at Winnipeg,” December 29, 1914, in the Library 
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recognized that their contributions to the war effort during and after “[the Second Battle 
of] Ypres gave Canada a direct stake in a war the British seemed to be bungling.”54  
Naturally, the realizations that British commanders were sending Dominion troops into 
bloodbaths shattered conceptions of the infallible British Empire and raised numerous 
doubts about British control.  As a result, it is unsurprising that by 1917, a time in which 
“British forces were often portrayed as floundering in the mud,” portrayals of Canada’s 
“elite shock troops … thrown into battle … to deliver victory time and time again” 
became regular in Canada.55  Further highlighting these doubts, Robert Borden 
commented years later that “the chief constitutional question that arose related to the 
sufficiency of Dominion legislation for the control and discipline of Canadian forces 
overseas.”56  Throughout the war, Borden adamantly pursued direct control of the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, an endeavor he found largely fruitless.  Simultaneously, 
as casualties mounted, writers publicized that “Canada’s sons have freely given their 
lives to save us … with unabated courage and determination,” praising troops for “their 
devotion and … spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice.”57 This type of portrayal saturated 
the Dominion’s print culture during the Great War.  Repeated throughout the war, the 
theme of dutiful sacrifice served “as the common bond of national identity” by 
cultivating a sense of common hardship in the name of Canada, rather than the Empire.58 
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battle, see Ibid., 110-15. 
55 Cook, Shock Troops, 4. 
56 Sir Robert Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies: The Marfleet Lectures (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1922), 98. http://www.archive.org/stream/canadianconstitu00borduoft#page/n5/mode/2up 
(accessed April 23, 2010). 
57 “An Earnest Appeal,” The Minnedosa Tribune, October 24, 1918. 
http://manitobia.ca/cocoon/launch/en/newspa pers/MDT/1918/10/24/2/Olive (accessed April 20, 2010). 
58 Johnson, British Imperialism, 139. 
  26
 
 
 Undeniably, then, in both the political and public spheres, ideas of the nation had 
certainly shifted toward a Canadian identity.  Concerns about the quality of British 
leadership evidenced the changes in several ways.  First, Canadians were largely unified 
in their understandings of themselves from the beginning of the war but their vision 
arranged themselves loyally within the British Empire.  However, the concerns with 
British leadership facilitated the realization that British interests were not necessarily 
synonymous with the concerns of Canadians.  Hence, many Canadians became 
disillusioned with the Empire and called for increased control of their troops abroad, most 
notably demonstrated through Robert Borden’s objections.  This recognition of disjointed 
interests is indicative of the “limited” and “community” prerequisites.  Moreover, unlike 
South Africa, where the people needed no help recognizing their identity outside the 
Empire, the war provided Canadians with an opportunity to build a reputation that 
belonged solely to Canada.  Coupled with the concerns over British leadership, the 
resulting heroic images of Canadians in the field helped the Dominion’s citizens to build 
a joint Canadian historical identity and thus to disconnect their unity from Britain, 
thereby channeling their unification toward Canada itself under the “imagined” 
prerequisite.  In the end, for a colony consisting of large “English- and French-speaking 
communities …, it is understandable that Canadians wanted to see the war as a common 
sacrifice and the crucible of a national identity.”59  However, Britain provided few 
measures of control to Canada.  Somewhat intuitively, Borden lamented in 1921 that 
“[u]ntil the Dominions participate more fully and effectively in directing foreign policy 
[sic] it is improbable that” continued cooperation within the Empire “will appeal strongly 
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to their people.”60  The years following the First World War would prove his observation 
accurate. 
 In many ways, the interwar years represented the earliest origin of Canada’s 
nationhood.  After the British leadership’s gaffes in World War I, Canada had—in some 
scholars’ opinions—become “so mature politically … that Canadian politicians … 
largely jettisoned imperial issues as topics of debate” during the inter-war period.61  
Simultaneously, politicians grew progressively more vocal, likely in response to the new 
national identity and disillusioned cynicism that developed toward Britain in World War 
I.  During this period, Canadian politicians—like Borden, William MacKenzie King, and 
R.B. Bennett—“continued to push for a reappraisal of the constitutional relationship 
between Britain and the dominions,” acting as a contributing catalyst for the Balfour 
Declaration and Statue of Westminster.62  Reflecting in his diary several years after the 
Balfour Declaration, King especially resented British stonewalling, believing “… 
Churchill & others did not like [the idea of division between] His Majesty Br. Govt. & 
H.M. other Governments they wanted only H.M. govt. in England.”63 The increased 
political demands and King’s bitterness insinuates that Canadians had formulated their 
own interests that the politicians were now expected to represent independently of British 
control, achieving the “community” prerequisite.  Furthermore, in securing their 
autonomy constitutionally, Canada fulfilled the “sovereignty” prerequisite too. 
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63 William Mackenzie King, January 25, 1928 diary entry, The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, in 
the Library and Archives of Canada, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/king/001059-119.02-
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 Curiously, even after the Statue of Westminster, Canadian politicians “remained 
highly suspicious … about Britain’s intentions.”64   Specifically, King, after being elected 
prime minister, emerged as the greatest defender of Canadian autonomy within the 
Commonwealth.  As World War II loomed on the horizon, King’s “fear … that the war 
would be used as a pretext to challenge the idea of Dominion autonomy” became quite 
prolific.65  Canada insisted “that its declaration of war” be viewed as “a Canadian, not an 
imperial decision” and “was much more assertive in its military relationship with Britain 
than were the antipodean Dominions”—demanding direct control of Canadian 
contingents.66  Even during the war, King harped on Canada’s choice to participate, 
preaching that “Canada’s war effort is a voluntary effort. It is the free expression of a free 
people … we entered the war of our own free will, and not as the result of any formal 
obligation.”67  Such a strong front from King likely served more to calm Canadian fears 
that Britain would attempt to encroach upon the Dominion’s newfound independence, 
and certainly shows that the processes in changing self-images did not simply start and 
stop at any point; they were evolving movements with momentum that carried on beyond 
the achievement of autonomy.  Equally, Canada’s excursions in foreign policy, foremost 
with the United States, likely reinforced both political confidence and “a sense of 
independence that would not … be surrendered” after the war.68  Clearly, then, Canada’s 
initially unified sense of enthusiastic patriotism was transformed during World War I into 
distrust of Britain’s leadership and a fledgling national identity.  World War I made 
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“Canadians … deeply conscious of a national identity … they no longer felt it necessary 
to adopt without question usages, manners and behavior simply because they were 
British.”69  The First World War had “created a new sense that Canadians had done 
something important together,” nurturing a sense of national identity and kick-starting a 
process of nationalist evolution toward autonomy, comparable to South Africa’s, that 
overcame previous divisions and matured during the interwar years with the Statute of 
Westminster and continued to solidify through the Second World War.70 
Australia & New Zealand 
 For South Africa and Canada, Dominions with multiple large European-
descended populations, the process of recognizing their distinct histories happened 
rapidly because their citizenship and ensuing consolidation provided them with ready 
supplied of non-British background.   Comparatively, the Dominions of Australia and 
New Zealand were heavily dominated by British settlers in terms of Europeans and 
centralized into singular colonies later than either South Africa or Canada.  For instance, 
while Canadian provinces unified for the first time in 1867, Australians were still 
establishing provinces as late as 1850 and 1859 in Victoria and Queensland, respectively.  
This lag was further underscored by the fact that local self-government was not adopted 
until 1856 in the various provinces, and that “New Zealand did not become a single state 
until 1876 and Australia was unified only in 1901.”71  Unsurprisingly, this tendency to 
trail behind was repeated again in the changing conceptions of the nation, as Australia 
and New Zealand largely followed in the footsteps of its sister Dominions from the First 
World War onward. 
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 In the previous cases, at the time of World War I, changing perceptions of the 
nation were rapid because South Africa and Canada each possessed mixed European 
populations that, when amalgamated, distinguished them readily from their British 
counterparts elsewhere.  As a result, the unified identity(-ies) of each Dominion were 
quickly detached from Britain because the roots of a unique history already existed by the 
war era.  However, in Australia and New Zealand, where the populations were almost 
exclusively British immigrants, no such distinguishing characteristics were present.  As a 
result, when South African and Canadian notions of the nation were briskly transforming, 
Australia and New Zealand initially lacked qualities that discerned them from Britain and 
were thus fiercely loyal to the British.  In fact, one scholar even proposed that early 
nationalists believed that “…Australia itself had so short a white history … that it was not 
thought a suitable medium to inculcate patriotism or national unity.”72  Yet, the World 
War I experience would fill that vacuum by creating a tradition on which to base 
Australian and New Zealand history and unity.  In Australia and New Zealand, the war 
years were defined by the creation of unique identity—embodied in the ANZAC myth—
and its ensuing consolidation.  In true white settler colony fashion, Australia and New 
Zealand were wholeheartedly attached to the British nation initially; their people were 
mostly British, emigration from Britain was continuing in large numbers, and the 
populace fundamentally associated themselves with their British heritage with solidarity 
unrivalled by other Dominions.  From the war’s outset, the two Dominions were colonies 
looking for greater recognition of their value within the larger Empire and therefore, as in 
Canada, greeted Britain’s declarations of war in 1914 with great shows of imperial 
patriotism.  Citizens “hailed England’s declaration of war on Germany with the most 
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complete and enthusiastic harmony in their history.”73  In Australia, this loyalty was 
furthermore demonstrated by the fact that “[a]ll of Australia’s troops were volunteers, 
conscription having been rejected.”74  Australians and New Zealanders clearly “hoped … 
to see their country attain partnership status within the Empire” and showed their 
enthusiasm while shouldering their share of the war’s burdens.75  However, as the early 
stages of the war passed, these attitudes began to change.  
 Much like the phenomenon in Canada, the staggering casualties absorbed in the 
war shattered the Dominions’ blind faith in the British Empire, as stories of recurring 
mistakes and blunders attributed to British military incompetency streamed into the 
Dominion.  Again mirroring Canada, images of the heroic soldiers of the Australian and 
New Zealand Army Corps, or “ANZACs”, began to appear and the “myth of ANZAC” 
became a major vehicle for national identity and disillusionment with Britain during the 
war.  In one scholar’s opinion, writers and politicians consciously cultivated the ANZAC 
myth to replace the illusion of British invincibility by giving the ANZACs supposedly 
unique, non-British qualities like ruggedness and egalitarianism.76   The myth was first 
conceived after the ANZACs participated in the disastrous Gallipoli campaigns, where 
they were first exposed to poor British leadership at the expense of thousands of lives.  
For example, one newspaper reported that British leadership had guided “the position of 
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the troops” so poorly as “to be unique in military history.  They possessed every possible 
military defect, and were completely subjected to the artillery fire of the Turks … the 
communications were insecure .... There was no means of concealing or of deploying 
fresh troops ….”77  After such portrayals of Gallipoli, the British were permanently 
associated with military ineptitude and ANZAC soldiers came to resent the Brits for the 
atrocious casualty rates throughout the war, as many developed “strong, often bitter, anti-
British feeling” during World War I.78  As this image of British incompetence became 
prominent, so, too, did portrayals of Australian and New Zealand heroism at Gallipoli.  
Stories of ANZAC heroism strongly juxtaposed the portrayals of the British.   
 Recognizing the selling power, members of the Dominions’ press scrambled to 
identify qualities that made the “ANZAC” so much superior to his British counterpart.  
For instance, in the first few months of the Gallipoli campaign, The Brisbane Courier 
reported that Turkish counterattacks were viciously repulsed “owing chiefly to the 
gallantry and dash of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps … the troops have 
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.”79  Echoing these sentiments, another writer wrote 
of “the Anzac character, which to-day typifies the best that we know in dash, courage, 
and grim determination … that sporting spirit” amongst the troops.80  Soon, the 
stereotypical ANZAC came to be known for utilitarianism, determination, egalitarianism, 
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“mateship,” and other qualities supposedly instilled through rugged frontier lifestyles 
only available in Australia and New Zealand.81  Gallipoli had become “sacred soil …, the 
ground of their nationhood, the origin and proof of their Imperial partnership.”82  In the 
Dominions, citizens reveled in their troops’ reputation for “courage, their manhood, and 
their sheer dogged determination …” all the while taking the "greatest comfort from their 
mates ….”83 Australian Prime Minister William Hughes, during a visit to England to 
commemorate the first ANZAC Day, offered the following to assembled ANZAC 
veterans of Gallipoli and an assembled mass of British civilians: 
We who knew them, who had lived their lives, who were steeped with them in 
environment in which courage, resource, endurance, love of freedom, have been 
for generations the common heritage of the people, we who had seen the resolute 
and unfaltering strides with which the Australian people had set out to achieve 
their destiny.  … On the shining wings of your valour we were lifted up to heights 
we had never seen; you taught us truths we never knew; you inspired us to a 
newer and wider and nobler concept of life. … The deathless story of the 
Gallipoli campaign will be sung in immortal verse inspiring us and generations of 
Australians and New Zealanders, yet unborn, with pride of race, courage, tenacity 
of purpose, endurance, and that casting out of fear … teaching us that through the 
spirit of self-sacrifice alone can men or nations be saved.84  
 
Quite clearly, this passage defines the characteristics of ANZACs, positions the Gallipoli 
story as the start of a purely Australian and New Zealand martial history, and alludes to a 
national “destiny.”  Taken with the press’s favor for descriptions of ANZACs, these 
examples reveal the seminal role of the Gallipoli campaign and World War I in the 
fulfillment of the “imagined” prerequisite as Australians and New Zealanders perceived 
their own distinct national heritage, history, and characteristics for the first time. 
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 In addition to building a national history, their World War I experiences taught 
Australians and New Zealanders “their own worth, which formerly they had doubted, 
and” revealed “faults and cankers at the heart of their Empire, which once they had 
imagined great above every imperfection.”85 Still, while they undeniably possessed a 
new, developed idea of their individual nations, Australia and New Zealand apparently 
continued to believe their interests coincided with those of the British and sought 
recognition within the Empire as a result.  Despite the perceived blunders of the British 
during World War I and the consequent disillusionment that had caused such political 
uproar in South Africa and Canada alike, “there was little demand for change in 
constitutional arrangements,” as “Australia and New Zealand did not adopt the 
Westminster Statute until 1942 and 1947, respectively.”86  This inactivity can largely be 
attributed to the fact that the Australians and New Zealanders had yet to fully complete 
the “limited” and “community” prerequisites, processes which began in the years 
preceding World War II.  To elaborate, as conflict loomed closer and closer, the 
Dominions memories of World War I inspired great consternation that forced them to 
reconsider their continued trust in the British in relation to their imagined nations’ best 
interests.  By early 1937, “… Australia and New Zealand were acutely aware that the 
deteriorating situation in Europe would have implications for their own security,” and 
Australia was particularly vocal about its concerns.87   Still, both “Australia and New 
Zealand took it for granted that they would enter the war as part of the empire” and 
joined the war long before the Japanese threat materialized, as a “collapse of Britain 
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would have been a disaster for them.”88  Nevertheless, Britain “knew they would be 
unable to support Australia.”89  In fact, the situation grew so dire that British Dominions 
Secretary Clement Atlee informed Australian Prime Minister John Curtin that Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s “greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United 
States.”90  This prompted Curtin to reply that “Australia looks to America, free of any 
pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”91  With their 
“confidence in British protection shattered” by Atlee’s blunt statements and the collapse 
of France, Australia and New Zealand were forced to seize control of their own defense, 
which “resulted in much closer defence ties between Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States,” from which Britain’s relationships with its Dominions never fully 
recovered.92  These forays into foreign affairs diplomacy strengthened the confidence of 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s politicians in their self-sufficiency and implied that the 
Dominions had finally recognized and undertaken to pursue their personal interests, 
surpassing the “limited” and “community” prerequisites. 
 If World War I was critical for establishing the ANZAC myth as a basis for 
reimagining their nations, World War II drove Australia and New Zealand completely 
away, as their wartime treaties had made it clear that “they would no longer accept the 
British view of the post-war security system…,” and had become nearly self-reliant.93 
Indeed, the ratifications of the Statute of Westminster by Australia (1942) and New 
Zealand (1947) combined with their independent management of war time defense and 
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foreign affairs highlighted that neither Dominion trusted British leadership to represent 
their concerns and acted in their own interests.  As a result, the Second World War 
precipitated the changes in the Dominions’ ideas of the “nation” that had been forestalled 
by continued loyalty in the interwar years.  However, Australia and New Zealand were 
notable in that the changes were slower in coming than in South Africa and Canada, 
almost to the point of having been forced upon them.  For instance, acknowledgment of 
the disconnect between British and Australian/New Zealander’s interests was forced by 
the Atlee-Curtin exchange, even though Australia and New Zealand had desired further 
collaboration.  Suddenly pushed to assess their situation with newfound realism, the 
Dominions had no alternative other than to recognize the unavoidable split in defense 
priorities.  In turn, the denial of significant British support forced the Australians and 
New Zealanders into the realm of foreign affairs, resulting in several defense pacts with 
each other and the United States.  These negotiation and signing processes were 
conducted completely independent of the British government and gave critical experience 
to politicians from both Dominions while building confidence in their own self-reliance 
under the “community” prerequisite.  By the end of the war, one scholar described 
“Australia’s attitude to Empire” as “love and community on the one hand … frustration 
… on the other.”94  Lastly, the “sovereignty” prerequisite was finally realized in Australia 
and New Zealand when each Dominion ratified the Statute of Westminster, a change they 
had refused to make prior to World War II.  Already acting independently during the war, 
the Dominions fittingly completed the transition to autonomous nationhood almost as an 
afterthought, years later than their sister Dominions. 
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 Ultimately, then, Britain’s inability to assist in the defense of Australia and New 
Zealand had destroyed any remnant faith in the British Empire, consolidated their ideas 
of independence, enhanced their confidence in their foreign affairs abilities, and created 
closer ties to the United States.  All of these factors contributed to the realization of 
national identity in Australia and New Zealand.  Liz Reed summarized the general 
opinion nicely, saying World War I provided the means by which a national identity 
“could be ‘imagined’ by the generations who followed.”95  Furthermore, World War II 
was “a time in which the national identity, traceable to … Gallipoli, was consolidated” by 
soldiers who “in the spirit of the Anzacs, fought and saved Australia.”96  Tellingly, to the 
exclusion of other catalysts for identity, “Australia and New Zealand are …the only 
countries in the world whose most popular national day commemorates the death of 
citizens in a war fought abroad,” strongly emphasizing the battle’s importance with their 
historical tradition.97   With Australia and New Zealand cementing their autonomy late in 
World War II, some scholars attest that Britain’s “victory came at a price: a loss of 
prestige, … and ultimately, the acceleration of the process of decolonization.”98  The 
“story of Anzac,” when combined with “events during the Second World War,” meant 
that “the days of Empire in Australia were numbered.”99  Similarly, when considered 
together, each Dominion’s example hints at a pattern of transitioning ideas and strong 
final unifying tendencies, as even the least divided populations of Australia and New 
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Zealand became closely tied through the shared ANZAC tradition.  Yet, by rule, Britain 
intended to withhold autonomy from colonies other than the Dominions in the years after 
World War II.  Of course, no rule is without exceptions and, in this case, the British 
Empire would make an especially large exception indeed:  by 1947, the “jewel” of the 
Empire would be partitioned into the autonomous states of India and Pakistan. 
India & Pakistan 
 In the entirety of the British Empire, no colony was more valued than India under 
the British Raj.  Encompassing, among others, the modern day states of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and portions of Myanmar, British India was the foundation of the Empire’s 
international influence. India provided the British Empire with seemingly bottomless 
reserves of manpower, a vastly profitable trade center full of products and huge markets 
for exploitation, and a hub from which to operate a system of sub-imperialism in 
Southeast Asia.  The obvious, irrefutable value of the colony had wide-ranging effects 
upon the relationship between the Empire and India that, in turn, fundamentally affected 
the dynamics of changing national perceptions.  Most prominently, as the jewel of the 
Empire, India occupied its own tier of status between the Dominions and the remaining 
“dependent” colonies.  To elaborate, Indians were allowed to maintain representative 
groups like the Indian National Congress and, later, the Muslim League, which 
articulated their desires to the British through resolutions and political activities.  Despite 
these institutions, final decision making powers were vested in the British viceroy, who 
oversaw all activities in British India and possessed overall approval and veto abilities, 
severely restricting the abilities of Indians to effect changes of their own.  In turn, these 
restrictions caused considerable friction between the Indian population and the British, 
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periodically erupting into massive protest or violent unrest.  Additionally, the sheer size 
of the Raj meant that numerous minority groups presented many cleavages within the 
colony, including divisions derived from the Hindu caste system.  Nevertheless, changing 
perceptions of the nation again acted as a unifying stimulus.  Unlike the scenarios in the 
Dominions, though, the pattern in Indian society would not produce a single national 
identity, but multiple.  Above all, the religious divisions between the Hindu majority and 
the large Muslim minority that was highly concentrated in regions like the Punjab and 
Bengal came to dominate Indian political life by the time India was awarded its 
independence in 1947.  Fittingly, these divisions were the greatest determining factor in 
the eventual political fate of the Indian subcontinent, resulting in its ultimate partition —
against Britain’s steadfast objections—into the modern political states of India and 
Pakistan. 
 To understand this process, though, a preliminary understanding of British 
involvement in the subcontinent is necessary first.  Under the influence of the British East 
India Company from as early as the seventeenth century, India was originally controlled 
through the Company’s policy of “divide and rule,” which sought to exploit the pre-
existing social and religious cleavages.  By maintaining these differences, the British East 
India Company prevented major unified opposition very effectively.  Nonetheless, by the 
1850s, Indians had grown restless and, after a string of violent protests culminating in the 
Indian Rebellion of 1857, British imperial troops were called in to re-establish order 
alongside the Company’s troops.  Recognizing the potentially disastrous implications of 
prolonged political upheaval in the colony, the British government officially brought 
India into the Empire following their intervention, ushering in the era of the British Raj.  
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After the transfer, the British ruled through the station of the British viceroy, who directly 
presided over the Company’s former territories, while instituting indirect rule through the 
Indian princely states.  With this system, the British achieved direct control, allowing 
them to minimize the extent of unrest (which was still prevalent) in the colony up to the 
start of the First World War.100 
 For India, involvement in the World Wars radically changed the domestic 
political topography and the relationship between the colony and the Empire.  While the 
relationship between the Empire and the Indian colony had always been tumultuous, the 
First World War instilled a sense of distrust toward the imperial sovereign that had 
previously been lacking.  In doing so, the war drastically worsened the British-Indian 
relationship by eliminating any faith Indians reposed in the British and encouraging 
cooperation between Indians in spite of the subdivisions in their culture.  At the 
beginning of the war, “modern emancipation movements … were taking shape, bringing 
to an end both the pre-nationalist opposition of those in power before colonization, and 
the more or less willing acceptance of colonial domination by a new elite.” 101  
Nonetheless, much like the reactions seen in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 
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Indians greeted the declaration of war with widespread “manifestations of loyalty and 
readiness to give” assistance to the war effort.102  However, India’s contributions were 
not based on a pure sense of imperial voluntarism or on desires to prove themselves 
worthy of imperial partnership, as was the case in those Dominions.  Instead, Indian 
cooperation was grounded in their own hopes for autonomy from the very beginning, as 
many Indians “believed that the Empire would give India home rule” if they cooperated 
with the British effort and, under this logic, many Indians believed “the Empire must 
therefore be saved.”103  In one member of the Congress’s words, “the condition of India’s 
usefulness to the Empire is India’s freedom.”104  Returning to India from South Africa in 
1915, Mohandas Gandhi commented that India’s “freedom is situated on French soil … If 
we could but crowd the battlefields of France with an indomitable army of Home Rulers 
fighting for victory for the cause of the allies [sic], it would also be a fight for our 
cause.”105   
 These statements reveal important insights into the Indian understanding of their 
place within the Empire and of their ideas of nationhood.  Differing significantly from the 
‘white settler’ Dominions, Indians had already “imagined” their group separately from 
the British prior the First World War.  For a number of reasons, this difference is 
unsurprising:  Indians lacked the basic connection to Britain as a result of continued 
settlement, practiced different religions, were already conscious of their “ancient 
history,” and were unavoidably differentiated racially.106  Yet, on the other hand, the 
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“limited” and “community” prerequisites were a different matter altogether.  While 
members of the Indian National Congress frequently stressed that their participation in 
the war effort came with expectations of reward, the British government exacerbated the 
situation by encouraging optimism in the Indian nationalists with ambiguous policy.  
Above all, Edwin Montagu’s speech in the British House of Commons inspired great 
hopes for Indians, when he claimed the “policy of His Majesty’s Government is the 
gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive 
realisation of responsible government in India as part of the Empire.”107  Montagu’s use 
of the terms “gradual development,” “progressive realisation,” and “responsible 
government,” while ostensibly quite reassuring to Indians, are noticeably vague in terms 
of implementation.  Consequently, as Gandhi’s statement revealed, many nationalists (or 
“Home Rulers”) still believed that Britain’s overall goals coincided with theirs and thus 
promoted cooperation with the British war effort as a means of achieving both groups’ 
aims.  Therefore, Indians cannot be said to have fulfilled the “limited” or “community” 
prerequisites, as they perceived a lingering unity of interests with the British Empire 
and—much as Australia and New Zealand after the war—continued to pursue common 
ends, trusting in the British to make good their seemingly benevolent promises.  
Unfortunately for them, their trust in British intentions was misplaced, as the ambiguity 
of British rhetoric proved to be the undoing of their lofty hopes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
York: John Day Company, 1942), 46-7, 53; Mohandas Gandhi, All Men Are Brothers: Autobiographical 
Reflections, ed. Krishna Kripalani (New York: Continuum, 2000), 158; Mohandas Gandhi, “Statement to 
the Press,” February 26, 1946, in Gandhi in India: In His Own Words, edited by Martin Green (Hanover, 
NH: University Press of New England, 1987), 335.  For some of Jinnah’s references to the Muslim/Indian 
historical past, see Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Presidential Address at the All India Muslim League Lahore 
session, March 1940,” edited by Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, vol. 1 
(Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1960), 161-3. 
107 Edwin Montagu, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 97 (20 August 1917): 1695-97.  
  43
 
 
 Nevertheless, still unaware of the divergence between Britain’s intent and their 
own hopes, Indian politicians remained supportive of the recruitment efforts throughout 
the war.  Over the course of the war, the Indians not only furnished massive numbers of 
troops, but had also “paid the cost of providing a million men to fight for Britain,” a 
gesture unique to India’s war contributions.108  As a result, as late as 1919, Indians 
remained optimistic, expecting significant changes to the structure of imperial 
government in India.  In that year, two significant events occurred that irreparably 
disillusioned the formerly cooperative Indians, just as World War I had disillusioned the 
Dominions, and set the tone for Indian politics in the interwar years.  First, instead of 
receiving the measures of autonomous control they anticipated, Indians were rewarded 
for their wartime contributions by the 1919 Government of India Act, which pioneered 
the system of dyarchy.  Under the system of dyarchy, “Indians were given a considerable 
role in government at a provincial level” over comparably peripheral areas like education, 
agriculture, and public health, “leaving Britain responsible for central government, above 
all for those areas such as security and finance, which reinforced the existence of the Raj” 
rather than weakening it.109  Therefore, these policies that the British viewed as 
concessions were received with outrage by many members of the INC, prompting a 
number of congressmen, most importantly Mohammed Ali Jinnah, to leave the 
Legislative Council in protest.  Worse yet, the Indians were destined to be shockingly 
disappointed by the British again. 
 The second devastating event occurred in April 1919: the Amritsar Massacre, 
named for the town in the Punjab in which it occurred.  Initially an organized protest 
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against recent arrests and mistreatment by the British, the amassed Indians eventually 
escalated into a violent mob, looting and burning banks and shops.  In the process, three 
Englishmen were murdered and two women were assaulted.  Attempting to restore order, 
British troops moved into the town under the command of General Reginald Dyer and 
established marshal law.  Several days later, Dyer and his contingent marched throughout 
the town reading a proclamation that deemed any meeting of more than four males to be 
an unlawful assembly that would be dispersed by force, if declared necessary.  Later that 
afternoon, at the Jallianwala Bagh (Amritsar’s principal meeting grounds), a religious 
festival was taking place to mark Baisakhi, the opening of a Sikh religious festival.  
Marching a column of troops into position on an embankment overlooking the recessed 
gathering area, Dyer commanded his men to open fire, resulting in some 380 civilians 
deaths. No one ordered the crowd to disperse or any warning at all.  Worsening the 
situation, after the shooting started, the crowd of thousands rushed to evacuate the area 
through the three narrow roads leading into the area and created a gridlock in which 
numerous people were injured and trampled as well as targeted by the soldiers.  
Justifying his orders, Dyer later reported that “my force was small and to hesitate might 
induce attack.  I immediately opened fire and dispersed the mob. … My party fired 1650 
rounds.”110  After the Massacre, the British government could have defused the situation 
by punishing Dyer appropriately for his shortsighted brutality, but instead “the British 
saw this as a praiseworthy pre-emptive measure to maintain law and order, whatever the 
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cost,” understandably infuriating Indians across the colony.111  For obvious reasons, 
Indians were furious and, when taken with Britain’s apparent intransigence in terms of 
political concessions, began to seek their own solutions. 
 Much like effects of disastrous British leadership for the Dominions’ perceptions, 
these events were critical in the transition of national thought in colonial India toward 
nationalist identity during the interwar years.  After 1919, Indians had lost all confidence 
in the British government’s promises of gradual reform, shattering their misconceptions 
of common interests.  In the eyes of Indians, the 1919 Government of India Act had 
exposed Britain’s true intentions for India: retain as much control for as a long as 
possible regardless of Indian cooperation.  Furthermore, the Amritsar Massacre 
undeniably demarcated the British as outside the boundaries of the Indian nation under 
the “limited” prerequisite, since the British applauded an outright atrocity as an 
acceptable, even integral, part of maintaining imperial control.  In the wake of these 
revelations, Indian “[n]ationalist organizations and parties began to demand … a 
relaxation of authoritarian rule and an increasing share in government and administration.  
… excessive paternalism … was rewarded by demonstrations and acts of sabotage.”112  
Politicians who had vocally promoted the British war effort felt especially scorned.  In 
particular, Gandhi was deeply offended.  Reflecting upon his former stance of 
cooperation as a means to gain concessions from the British, Gandhi lamented that he 
“clung to British rule because, in my ignorance, I attributed to it strength for undertaking 
the great task of smashing this civilization.  But now I see that British rule is perhaps 
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more Satanic than what Germany does.”113  Though he immediately backpedalled from 
his comparison, the fact that Gandhi even ventured to compare Germany—still embattled 
with negative connotations as a result of the First World War—and Britain is revealing of 
the deep sense of distrust and betrayal that he felt after the Empire reneged on their 
promises.  Undeniably, “the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 disillusioned Indians about 
British intentions,” creating an environment of frustration among Indian politicians and 
people.114 
 So, in a period when the white Dominions were receiving constitutionally 
supported independence in the 1926 Balfour Declaration and the 1931 Statute of 
Westminster, India was radicalizing politically.  The events of 1919 had, in the minds of 
Indian politicians, drawn the “line in the sand” and more radical changes to the ideas of 
the nation began to occur in the 1920s.  For instance, whereas each of the Dominions had 
undergone unification processes prior to changing their ideas of the nation, India did not.  
First of all, because the regions defined by the British were largely foreign constructs 
established in the nineteenth century, the Indians themselves associated themselves with 
the regions as much (or as little) as they did with the nation.  As Sunil Khilnani 
explained, in India, “a sense of region and nation emerged together, through parallel self-
definitions,” which contributed to the “distinctive, layered character of Indianness.”115  
Because “regional identity only came into being as people tried to define a large ‘Indian’ 
community,” the two identities (regional and national) were generally not seen as 
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contradictory, but rather as corresponding parts of each other.116  As a result, the regional 
and ethnic unifications that were necessary in the Dominions did not occur in India.  
However, while the potential problems of regional divisions were avoided, Indian 
nationalism would experience a significant divergence, unseen in the Dominions, based 
on religion. 
 The interwar years in India were critically important to the Indian nationalist 
movement because, in the wake of the events of 1919, the developing movement split 
along religious cleavages, eventually evolving into two large, religo-nationalist 
groupings, a conversion in which the role of nationalist leaders cannot be overstated.  
Specifically, nationalism in India “developed strong religious and cultural elements” 
along Hindu and Muslim divisions that affected the ways people revised their ideas of 
nation.117  The first step in the emergence of religion as a nationalist fault-line was the re-
emergence of the Muslim League under Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the former Congress 
member who had vacated his seat in protest of the 1919 Government of India Act.  
Having joined the Muslim League in 1913 while still a member of the INC, Jinnah’s 
departure from the Congress allowed him to focus his political life on the League 
exclusively.  Over the course of the 1920s, Jinnah campaigned for legal protections of 
minority rights, specifically for Muslims, who comprised approximately a quarter of the 
population.  During this time in the mold of a true lawyer, Jinnah believed that minority 
groups could achieve security for themselves through legal and constitutional processes 
in collaboration with the Congress after achieving independence from Britain.  However, 
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Jinnah’s crusade for minority protections highlighted the disparities between the two 
religious groups and the League’s emergence made religion an inherent part of national 
definitions because by openly restricting membership to only Muslims.  Nonetheless, for 
the time being, the two groups’ upper echelon politicians saw the potential benefits of 
collaboration. 
 Indeed, although religion determined the limits of the nation for Gandhi and 
Jinnah, this fact did not initially imply to the two nationalist groups that they pursued 
different goals.  In actuality, they viewed the British as their common opponents and thus 
originally cooperated, reminiscent of the cooperation between Hertzog and Smuts to 
pursue South Africa’s interests, which took precedent over their respective party 
affiliations.  In this case, though, Gandhi’s and Jinnah’s suggests that their perceptions of 
their separate communities were underdeveloped and suggests in the framework that the 
Indian nationalists still believed in their overall unity, while recognizing the disconnect 
from the Empire.  After all, like the Boers and British in South Africa, both groups 
ultimately wanted independence from the Empire and might have ended up within a 
unified state too.  Even so, each group conceived of their nation in slightly different ways 
that would become entrenched in their psyches.  For example, to Gandhi and his 
followers, the final national interest was independence from Britain, to be achieved 
through inclusion of both Muslims and Hindus within a united India.  Writing in 1929, 
tired of British intransigence in awarding India the Dominion status, Gandhi stated that 
“the unexpectedly unanimous Indian demand,” put to the British was “now Complete 
Independence.”118 Throughout the rest of his political life, Gandhi emphasized 
“communal unity, which is as dear to me as life itself,” as a fundamental aspect of his 
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rhetoric, believing that India’s greatest strength could be achieved through unity despite 
its great diversity and the defined religious groups.119   
 Similarly, Jinnah’s conception of the nation at this time was steeped in religious 
terminology, but religious differences did not inherently preclude broader cooperation 
with Hindu Indians.  He held the opinion that the “essential requisite condition to achieve 
Swaraj is the political unity between Hindus and Muslims.”120  In reality, then, Jinnah’s 
words indicated similar intent for the Muslim nation in 1928 as he claimed “… there is no 
progress for India until the Mussalmans and the Hindus are united, and let not logic, 
philosophy, or squabble stand in the way of coming to a compromise and nothing will 
make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.”121  Reiterating this sentiment 
in April 1936, Jinnah observed that “eighty million Muslims of India are willing and even 
more anxious … to fight for the freedom of mother India, hand in hand with other 
communalities.”122  Without a doubt, while the groups understood the boundaries 
between their groups along religious terms, the Muslim League and INC each saw their 
community’s interests as analogous.  The continued ideas of communal interests indicate 
that, at this time, the third and fourth prerequisites had yet to be realized and suggested 
that Indian nationalism took priority to religious loyalties.  In fact, Jinnah summarized the 
viewpoint concisely in 1934, saying “I am an Indian first, and a Muslim afterwards.”123 
However, much as the events of 1919 had incited radical changes, so too would those of 
1935. 
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 In the meantime, despite the nationalists’ cooperation with each other, the British 
continued to stifle Indian nationalist appeals.  Through the 1920s and 30s, the two sides 
played something of a game of cat and mouse: the Indians would demand concessions, 
the British would stonewall before desperately attempting to mitigate the damage, but it 
would be too late and the Indians would increase their demands.  To illustrate, in 1929, 
the British viceroy, Lord Irwin, announced that Britain’s ultimate aim in India was to 
establish Dominion status; however, by that time, Indian nationalists had largely 
abandoned demands for raised status which had occupied much of the decade and 
replaced them with calls for complete independence.  Then, the British made another 
effort to placate the Indians that changed everything.  Intended to appease the nationalists 
(again), the Government of India Act of 1935 built upon the reforms of 1919, “by 
extending dyarchy to full provincial self-government.”124  The new act also contained a 
framework by which the Indian provinces and princely states could be united into a 
federation. Expecting this process of consolidation to be a lengthy, complex affair, the 
British sought to prolong their control, enabling them to protect the colony’s minorities 
(their greatest concern in public) and maintain key positions of power, “while nationalism 
would be distracted by the opportunities created by provincial self-government.”125  
While this intent was not lost on him, Gandhi supported the Act as a means of increasing 
the numbers of Indians involved with government, assuming they would operate free of 
British influence, and providing a forum for Muslims and Hindus to coexist within the 
government.  In 1937, amidst widespread debate “over whether congressmen should 
stand for election” to the new positions, “Gandhi surprised his followers by favoring such 
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candidacy.”126  However, Gandhi’s hopes for cooperation would ultimately be 
disappointed. 
 In spite of Gandhi’s hopes for amelioration, the 1935 Government of India Act 
eventually drove a wedge further between the Muslim League and other nationalists.  In 
fact, the elections of 1937 were pivotal in hardening the Muslim League’s desires for 
partition by eliminating any desires to cooperate with the INC.  During the elections, 
many Muslim League and Congress candidates ran in the elections, but “the Muslim 
League did poorly in winning only 4.6% of the vote” while the INC candidates won 
many of their seats.127  In the aftermath of their disappointing showing, Jinnah repeatedly 
approached the Congress to secure participation in the provincial ministries for non-
Congress Muslims, but was denied each time.  The landslide success of the Congress had 
instilled a keen sense of self-confidence in Nehru and other congressmen.  Believing their 
political position secure, the INC rejected opportunities to accommodate the Muslim 
League, setting in motion the chain of events that culminated in the creation of Pakistan.  
Summing up the effect, S.K. Majumdar posited that, “had the Congress handled the 
League more tactfully after the elections, Pakistan might never have come into being … 
Jinnah certainly created Pakistan.  But the Congress by its sins of omission and 
commission also helped to make it possible.”128 This rejection was the single greatest 
catalyst for Pakistan’s “community” prerequisite.  Afterwards, Jinnah and the League 
emphasized the divergences between their interests and those of the INC, precipitating a 
second shift in the understandings of the League’s national self-image that was entirely 
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unique to India as opposed to the Dominions.  The Congress’s steadfast denial of 
Jinnah’s requests made it painfully clear that, in Jinnah’s opinion, the INC only truly 
desired to further its own cause, rather than pursuing the common best interests of all 
Indians.  Consequently, after this point, the Muslim League and Jinnah in particular grew 
increasingly disinterested in any system that could potentially render them subject to the 
Hindu majority that had denied their calls for coalition.  By rejecting them, the INC had 
tried to “drive the League into political wilderness, but” instead Nehru’s party 
inadvertently helped “to strengthen Jinnah’s hands as the foremost champion of Muslim 
claims and rights.”129  With this seismic realignment, the Muslim League now had two 
enemies against which to juxtapose their national boundaries, the British as well as the 
Indian National Congress, and Jinnah prominently emphasized those boundaries.  In turn, 
Jinnah’s radical reversal directly altered the previously unified path of Muslims and 
Hindus by rallying the groups to religious affiliations and away from the ideas of a 
unified Indian nation, like those achieved in South Africa and Canada prior to autonomy.  
Thus, Jinnah’s changing outlook attests to the centrality of nationalist leaders within their 
movements by showing how quickly radical alterations can be implemented. 
 This shift in mentality was clearly visible as early as October of 1937, as Jinnah 
quickly adopted religo-political rhetoric designed to unify Muslim support behind the 
League.  Indeed, Jinnah’s new rhetoric appeared as early as his annual Presidential 
Address for the Muslim League’s 1937 session, in which he blasted the Congress for 
“alienating the Mussalmans of India … by pursuing a policy which is exclusively 
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Hindu.”130  Later in the speech, Jinnah urged Muslims to “establish your solidarity and 
complete unity,” arguing that only “a well-knit, solid, organised, united force can face 
any danger.”131  His repeated references to organization, unity, and solidarity are obvious 
attempts to bring together Muslim support behind his party, an effort designed to allow 
the Muslim League to challenge what Jinnah believed to be the Hindu dominated INC.  
While he had not yet begun to call for partition, Jinnah’s mental shift was very clear.   
The League had already viewed their nation as restricted to Muslims only, but had 
formerly observed a sense of shared interests with other Indians in their desires for 
independence from the British Empire.  Now angered by the INC’s rejection, the League 
perceived that the INC did not seek to accommodate the League’s interests.  As a result, 
the League began to purely pursue their personal interests and unity under the aegis of 
Islam, independently fulfilling the “community” prerequisite and now fully constituting a 
separate fledgling nation.  Therefore, what on the surface was a division in Indian 
nationalists, the League’s new position actually buttresses the unifying tendencies first 
observed in the Dominion.  However, while simultaneously stressing the effect leadership 
can have in consciously guiding and shaping that unity, in light of the Dominion 
examples, the dramatic reversal of position toward divisive politics orchestrated by 
Jinnah appears to have been an exception rather than the rule in perceptions of the nation 
promoted by successful movements. 
 Throughout the rest of the interwar era, both the INC and Muslim League 
continued to gather support around their parties and each grew increasingly disinterested 
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in cooperation with the other.  Gandhi continued to preach the importance of non-violent 
cooperation and the League, under Jinnah’s guidance, grew increasingly antagonistic 
with their rhetoric. It was during this time that Gandhi came to be associated as the INC’s 
leader, largely as a result of Jinnah’s propagandizing.  For instance, in his 1938 
Presidential Address before the Muslim League, Jinnah attacked the Congress as 
“nothing but a Hindu body” intoxicated with its power and Gandhi as “responsible for 
turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism and for the 
establishment of Hindu Raj in India.”132  Clearly, in little over a year, the League, with 
Jinnah as the main catalyst, had evolved a new view of the nation that defined both 
British and Hindu (represented by the INC) interests as oppositional to their own.  So, 
much like the events of 1919 had forced Indians to recognize the divergences between 
their interests and those of the British, the 1937 election emphasized the difference of 
interests between the INC and Muslim League, resulting in the League’s first 
independent pursuits of their interests, thus completing the “community” prerequisite for 
the Muslims.  It would be another ten long years before either group would fulfill the 
“sovereignty” prerequisite. 
 Now that the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League openly competing 
against each other as well as the British, the political scene in India became more 
complex and progressively more volatile.  Notwithstanding the social instability, it took 
an experience as traumatic as the Second World War to finally set in motion the 
departure of the British from India.  After the British declared war on Germany in 1939, 
the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, notoriously announced without consulting either the 
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Congress or Muslim League that, as a dependency in the British Empire, India was now 
at war.  Naturally, members of Congress were incensed by the humiliating rebuke and 
their response was expectedly swift and furious, as they “demanded to be included in 
central government, and when this was denied, the Congress provincial ministries 
resigned in protest.”133  Recognizing the potential political benefit for Muslims, Jinnah 
“sought to turn the British-Congress cleavage to his own advantage” by avoiding open 
denunciations of the war effort and even “hinting support for the war effort.”134  These 
different reactions to the declaration of war further highlighted the differences between 
the two groups.  The INC’s actions indicate their primary concern for Indian 
independence, while the Muslim League’s alternative approach, designed to garner 
leverage that could insure Muslim rights, reiterated that independence was secondary and 
only acceptable if accompanied by protective measures, thus highlighting the differing 
platforms and visions of the two groups.  Soon, Jinnah’s shrewd political maneuvering 
produced leverage that would blossom into full-blown demands for a separate, partitioned 
Muslim state. 
 On March 22, 1940, Mohammad Jinnah delivered his Presidential Address to the 
Muslim League in the Lahore session and, for the first time, articulated his desires to see 
Hindus and Muslims partitioned into separate independent states.  The speech employed 
rhetoric that echoed the three prerequisites and was the first step toward final sovereignty 
for the League.  In his speech, Jinnah declared that “Muslim India is now conscious” and 
“we are now … very apprehensive and can trust nobody,” reminiscent of the imagined, 
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limited, and community prerequisites while emphasizing internal cohesion.135  Two days 
earlier, on March 20, Gandhi had published a statement in the most recent issue of 
Harijan, in which he had referred to Jinnah as “my brother” in another appeal for 
overarching Indian unity.136  Two days later, during his address, Jinnah joked about the 
comment, saying that the “only difference is this, that brother Gandhi has three votes and 
I have only one vote,” a criticism proposing Gandhi and other Hindus held more sway 
with the British than did Jinnah.  The jab might also be interpreted as an accusation that 
the Congress was only interested in cooperating with the Muslims in order to achieve an 
independent government because the Hindus were aware that their majority could 
subjugate the Muslims through a Constituent Assembly.137  Either way, the most critical 
passage was yet to come, and it proved to be one of the most influential passages in the 
era.  Jinnah continued that 
[t]he problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an 
international one, and it must be treated as such.  So long as basic and 
fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will result in 
disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Mussalmans but to 
the British and Hindus also.  … the only course open to us all is to allow the 
major nations separate homelands by dividing India into ‘autonomous national 
states’…. 
 … our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hindu-
ism.  They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, 
different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims 
can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian 
nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of your troubles … 
The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social 
customs, literatures … neither intermarry nor interdine together and … belong to 
two different civilizations … To yoke together two such nations under a single 
state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to 
growing discontent and final destruction ….138 
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The pattern for Jinnah’s rhetoric over the next seven years is laid bare in this passage 
that, in 1940, was met with a thunderous ovation by the assembled Muslim League.  The 
next day, the League adopted the “Lahore Resolution,” which stated that “no 
constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it 
is designed … that geographically contiguous units …[in] the areas in which the Muslims 
are numerically in a majority … should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent 
States’….”139  Obviously, these demands were a drastic departure from previous 
propositions of affiliations through constituent representation or federal models and 
demonstrated the first demands for partitioned independence in the Pakistan Movement.  
These demands would not be met until 1947. 
 In the seven years between the Lahore Resolution and independence for India and 
Pakistan, one event occurred that finally precipitated the completion of the “sovereignty” 
prerequisite through the ultimate partitioning of the two groups.  By March of 1942, 
Britain was wholly concerned with conducting the war.  Yet, the tensions between 
Hindus, Muslims, and the British could not be ignored without risking serious conflicts 
that could disrupt vital supplies and troops coming from India.  Unwilling to compromise 
but unable to ignore the situation any longer, Churchill dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps, a 
left-wing politician from the Cabinet, to resolve matters.  Unfortunately for Cripps, 
Churchill’s staunch refusal to offer full independence, effective immediately, meant that 
Cripps “was empowered only to repeat the proposals already made in 1940, that is to 
offer India full Dominion status after the war (or the option to secede from the Empire-
Commonwealth), in return for Indian co-operation during the war and a moratorium on 
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further political advance for its duration.”140  Of critical importance, the offer secondarily 
included a clause that dictated that “no part of India could be forced to accept 
membership of the post-war state, whatever form this took.”141  Worse yet for Churchill 
and Cripps, the INC had long ago lost interest in Dominion status and refused to abandon 
demands for an immediate control of the central government, a demand that was quickly 
denied.  Aware of Britain’s predicament and at Gandhi’s encouragement, the Congress 
passed the “Quit India” Resolution.  “Quit India” was designed as a nationwide non-
violent protest with the singular objective of forcing the British out of India by making 
simultaneous administration of India and the war impossible.  At first, the campaign 
promised to be a highly effective disruption in light of the outrage directed at the British 
and unity of Congress opinion.  However, by the next day, the British government had 
arrested Gandhi, many of the members of the Congress, and thousands of non-violent 
dissenters.  With Gandhi and most of the leaders of the Congress imprisoned for the rest 
of the war, “a dangerous political vacuum” had been created that allowed many members 
of the Muslim League to ascend to provincial administrative positions.  Similarly, 
without Gandhi presenting counter-arguments, Jinnah pitched his ideas of a separate 
Pakistan to the British.  In particular, Jinnah argued that, under the Cripps clause that had 
reserved the right for any group to refuse membership within the post-war state, the 
Muslim League would simply refuse to participate with any British plan that did not 
provide for a separate Muslim state, at which point, according to Jinnah, the Muslims 
would be effectively autonomous anyway.  By the time, Gandhi was released from prison 
in 1944, it was apparent to the British, who were still unconvinced on the issue of 
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partition, “that there was a real threat … of large-scale anti-British disorders, … aiming 
to expel British by paralyzing the administration” much as Gandhi’s Quit India had 
attempted in 1942.142  Coupled with the perpetual “communal strife between Hindus and 
Muslims,” the British recognized the volatility of the situation.  Still occupied by the war, 
though, Churchill’s government continued to procrastinate on the issue.  Finally, in 1945, 
the post-war Labour government of new Prime Minister Clement Attlee set about 
appeasing the demands of the two major nationalist groups.  Unfortunately for them, the 
British representative sent to reconcile the Congress and the Muslim League soon found 
that “Gandhi was indeed a tough negotiator” and, given Jinnah’s characteristic 
intransigence on the issue of partition, “[i]t proved impossible to bring Congress and the 
Muslim League together.”143  Both men clung adamantly to their positions with Gandhi 
demanding Britain’s departure from a united India and Jinnah demanding partition, 
thereby stalemating any proposal.  In the end, then, “Pakistan … owed everything to 
Jinnah.”144  Because of his steadfast support for partition and the unity of Muslim support 
behind him, the British came to recognize that “Muslim determination … was so great 
that chaos and maybe civil war would follow [partition’s] denial.  To unite India against 
Muslim wishes would necessarily involve force, while dividing India against the wishes 
of the Hindus would not.  And that was in the end the deciding consideration.”145  
Consequently, on August 15, 1947, the British colonies of India and Pakistan passed into 
independent membership within the British Commonwealth of Nations, alongside the 
white settler Dominions 
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Conclusion 
 In the end, then, very similar transitions in national identity occurred in both the 
Dominions and India; however, in India, the transition resulted in a divisive conclusion, 
due in large part to the intransigency of Gandhi and Jinnah, as opposed to the overall 
unifying effects seen in the Dominions.  As the theoretical framework of this study 
highlighted, each national movement redefined its perceptions of unity, its limits, sense 
of community, and constitutional sovereignty on the way to gaining full autonomy from 
the British Empire.  In the British Dominions of South Africa and Canada, ethnically 
mixed populations (of European descent) solidified into singular national groups with 
separate identities during the 1910-45 era.  Comparably, in Australia and New Zealand, 
where the settler population was almost singularly of British descent, the same processes 
inspired great unity as well, but was initially entrenched in support of the Empire.  As a 
result, these Dominions’ unity was more gradually disconnected from British loyalties 
than elsewhere.  Furthermore, in each case, the political leaders of the various groups 
were critical reflections of their colony’s changes, such as Jan Smuts and J.M.B. Hertzog 
in South Africa, who overcame Boer-British enmity to cooperate against the British or 
Robert Borden in Canada who grew increasingly disillusioned and concerned about 
Britain’s management of the First World War and thus British leadership in general.  As a 
result, the cases of the Dominions strongly suggest a pattern in the specific kinds of 
changes that must occur for nationalist movements to succeed as well as indicating that 
the process is fundamentally a unifying phenomenon.  Additionally, the transformations 
of Indian nationalists’ thought also supported the prerequisites pattern shown in the 
Dominions.  However, the pattern in India ended entirely differently than in the 
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Dominions due in large part to upper echelon disagreements between Mohandas Gandhi 
and Mohammad Ali Jinnah.  Interestingly contrasting Smuts and Hertzog in South Africa, 
Gandhi and Jinnah originally sought to cooperate with each other’s group before the 
Indian nationalist movement split along religious divisions.  In addition, Jinnah’s critical 
part in the creation of this nationalist Hindu-Muslim cleavage is another powerful 
indication of the central role that nationalist leaders occupy in the evolution of nationalist 
movements toward statehood.  Ultimately, then, while each case presented its own 
distinct context, a pattern of changing self-perceptions in successful nationalist 
movements against the British Empire is evident and suggests that a larger Empire-wide 
process may have existed.  Future research would do well to explore this possibility. 
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